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I. INTRODUCTION
Many have expressed a great deal of skepticism about the viability of
democracy in the last twenty years.  This skepticism proceeds from a crude 
version of Anthony Downs’s hypothesis of rational ignorance.1  In this
Article, I argue that the skepticism is not warranted, and I want to explore 
some ways in which political equality can be enhanced even within the 
frame given by Downs’s economics of information.  I think that there is 
reason to believe that democracy already works for ordinary and poor 
people, but that it does not work in an especially egalitarian way.  To see 
how democracy can become more egalitarian, I want to explore empirical
and normative dimensions of a hypothesis I am developing concerning the 
relation between worker participation in the running of economic firms 
and worker participation in political democracy.  I dub this the complementarity
hypothesis. The complementarity hypothesis asserts that there is complementarity
between successfully functioning political democracy and fairness in the 
structuring of economic life.  There are two main ways in which the 
complementarity works, only one of which I will pursue here.2  The one I 
explore here is that fairness in markets can make an important contribution to
the capacity of actual political democracy to live up to the principles that 
undergird it.  I will examine how the participation of workers in the running 
of firms can enhance the participation of workers in democracy.  This idea
is based on Anthony Downs’s thesis that the key obstacle to political equality 
is the division of labor in society.3  The response to this is to determine how
to alter the division of labor in society so that it accords better with the 
underlying democratic ideal. 
In this Article, I will first lay out what I describe as the crude Downsian
approach to political democracy and the skepticism about democracy that 
this has generated. Then, I will lay out some basic problems with this approach 
and show how the skepticism is not warranted.  I will then embark on the task
of developing an alternative Downsian approach to political democracy that
1. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207–76 (1957).
2. The second thesis associated with complementarity is that the underlying
justifications for political democracy and fairness in markets is quite similar, perhaps even 
deriving from the same principle; the idea is that political institutions and economic 
institutions are to be structured in accordance with a principle of equality of power in each 
domain. I have pursued this in my Articles.  Thomas Christiano, Equality, Fairness, and 
Agreements, 44 J. SOC. PHIL. 370 (2013); Thomas Christiano, The Tension Between the 
Nature and the Norm of Voluntary Exchange, 54 S.J. PHIL. (SPINDEL SUPPLEMENT) 
109 (2016); Thomas Christiano, The Wage Setting Process: A Democratic Conception of Fair 
Market Exchange, 11 ERASMUS J. PHIL. & ECON. 57 (2018). For a fuller conception in 
progress, see Thomas Christiano, Worker Participation and the Democratic Conception 
of Fairness in Markets (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
3. DOWNS, supra note 1, at 260–76. 
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I think is truer to Downs’s view and that is more sophisticated and
interesting. This will include a brief sketch of motivation, and an account
of the economics of information in politics.  I will then try to show that 
the skepticism that is expressed as a result of the crude Downsian approach
is not warranted on the more sophisticated approach. Finally, I will argue
that the enhancement of workers’ voice in the workplace, either through 
union representation or through more direct forms of participation, can
have a significant impact on the quality of participation in political democracy
and can enhance the political power of workers.  I will try to show how the
more sophisticated Downsian picture can generate this result and I will 
advance some empirical evidence to this effect.  All of this is a way of meshing 
philosophical ideas with analytical and empirical social science, which I 
will try to articulate in the Article.  At the very end, I will handle some objections
to the approach. 
II. RATIONAL IGNORANCE AND IRRATIONALITY
The main theme of the skeptics about political democracy is that we
cannot expect much good to come from citizen participation because they 
are either largely ignorant of the political and economic issues surrounding 
them, or they have some knowledge but that knowledge is deployed 
in such a partisan way that it is not really useful.4  The basic hypothesis is 
that the vast majority of citizens are either blissfully ignorant or have a 
little knowledge but use it to purely partisan ends.  Either citizens do not 
know what is going on or they are simply pushing policies and ideas that
make them feel good about themselves and their fellow partisans.  It is
hard to see how people like this can genuinely be bringing about major 
policy improvements.  It is hard to see how the possession of political 
power can actually be useful to such people.  Those changes may be occurring, 
but we must look for another reason—or so the skeptical argument goes. 
This conception of citizens derives its support from a particular model 
of how citizens think about politics as well as empirical evidence that appears 
to support the model.  The basic model comes down from Anthony Downs 
4. See generally JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2017); BRYAN CAPLAN, 
THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007);
GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: 
A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE (2006); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: 
WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2d ed. 2016). 
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and Joseph Schumpeter, though I will argue that the model is not really
true to the Downsian picture.5 
The root idea is very simple.  Citizens, individually, have extremely little 
impact on policy and the conditions of their lives through the vote, which
implies that the value of becoming informed about policy is very low if 
its main purpose is to improve the conditions of their lives.  To see this, 
note that the discount on the value of the vote is very high in large electoral 
constituencies because the chance that one’s vote makes a difference is
very small.  If the value of whatever information one collects is that one
makes a positive difference to the outcome when one is well-informed,
then the value of the information itself is very small because it is discounted
so heavily. A rational voter will not spend much time or resources to
acquire such information, at least if they are primarily self-interested and 
outcome oriented.
Rational voters may find some value in becoming informed if they can
use this information to get benefits directly from the political process itself.
That is, in some cases, they might find it enjoyable to form and participate
in groups regardless of how effective they are in bringing about good
political outcomes.6 They may end up becoming a bit informed in order to
enjoy these group benefits.  But the consequence of this is that the participation 
in whatever group they are in becomes unmoored from any concern with 
good political outcomes.  They just want to win because it is fun to fight 
together. This produces low quality policy ideas and a highly antagonistic 
relationship with others who are not part of the group.  So, it may be even 
worse than simple ignorance, though not much. 
III. THE CRUDE DOWNSIAN MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP
The assumptions behind this picture are: (1) people do not place very
much store in the common good, (2) they act only individualistically to
produce good outcomes, and (3) they must act on the basis of an appreciation 
of the first order reasons for action.  It should be noted before we start that 
none of these assumptions are part of Downs’s picture.  That is why I describe
this as a crude Downsian model.  The first two assumptions are added on 
and the third is clearly rejected by Downs’s account.7  Let us examine 
each one of these assumptions. 
5. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 207–76; JOSEPH A.SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 250–68 (3d ed. 1950). 
6. For the seminal discussion of these benefits, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 4, 7–8 (1971). 
7. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 6–14. 
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First, let us examine the two motivational assumptions in politics: 
people are primarily self-interested, and people do not act as contributors
to a larger common project but merely as separate maximizers of good
outcomes.  On the first assumption, citizens do not have to be completely
self-interested, they can be concerned to some degree with the common
good.  Indeed, it must be the case that most voters are concerned with the 
common good to some extent, otherwise they would not go to the polls at 
all, at least on the view that citizens are concerned with bringing about good 
outcomes.  But not too much.8 
This assumption of the primacy of self-interest is necessary.  For highly
altruistic voters who care a lot about the common good, the value of the 
consequence can be sufficiently good because so many people are affected, 
so that even if the probability that informed participation makes a difference 
is extremely low, it would still be rational to become informed about the
values of outcomes.9 
Second, the usual view is that persons are strategic maximizers in 
politics or purely individualistically outcome oriented.  They do not act as
members of groups and do things merely to do their share of what is necessary 
to bring about a good that the group is aiming at.  They are not reciprocators.
They do things mainly to promote the good on their own, however they
conceive of it. Or at least they must be primarily such maximizers.
Third, an important assumption in this context asserts a kind of 
individualism about knowledge and action based on knowledge.  The idea 
I am thinking of affirms that people can act on the basis of a good 
understanding of the issues only if they possess that understanding in a 
way that is directly available to them.  Let us call this a kind of epistemic 
individualism with regard to theoretical and practical reasoning.  My action 
is practically justified to the extent that it is based on my own appreciation 
of the reasons relating directly to my action and its outcome.  If I am not
able to grasp the first order reasons for my action, then I am not acting
with practical justification.  And one strong indicator of this, though not 
conclusive, is that I cannot articulate the reasons when I am asked for 
them. 
8. Ilya Somin calculates how much of a concern with the common good is necessary
to get voters to the polls while not being enough to get them to inform themselves.  See SOMIN, 
supra note 4, at 79–83. 
9.  For this argument, see DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 3, 13 (1984). 
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This last point is important because one of the central pieces of evidence
offered for the thesis that people vote in ways that are not effective in 
bringing about good outcomes is the evidence from empirical surveys of 
citizens’ knowledge of politics going back about sixty years.10 The net result
of these surveys has been consistently to affirm that people do not know 
the answers to basic questions about politics.  Somewhere between 30% 
to 60% get the wrong answers to basic questions.11  This evidence is sobering, 
without a doubt.  It seems to confirm the model that people are rationally 
ignorant of politics or rationally irrational, in some cases. 
There are two parts to the case for the thesis that citizens are not likely 
to be effective promoters of their own interests.  First, there is a model of 
the economics of information, which asserts that it is rational that they are 
almost entirely ignorant of politics.12  It assumes that citizens are predominantly 
self-interested and that they are individual maximizers.  And it assumes 
that, in order to be effective promoters of interests or the common good, 
voters must act on their own first order appreciation of the reasons for 
good action.  Second, there is extensive empirical evidence of ignorance 
on basic questions of politics.13 This evidence seems to confirm the model. 
A. The Basic Problems of the Crude Downsian Model 
But there are four very big problems with the crude Downsian model. 
The first big problem is that the crude Downsian model has a very difficult 
time explaining why democracies tend to do so well by the interests of their 
citizens.
We observe not only that democracies do pretty well on the whole and
generally much better than any self-described epistocracy, we also observe 
that as previously disenfranchised groups get the vote, their interests and
their ideas about the common good tend to be much better advanced.
There is a strong relationship between the rise of universal manhood suffrage
by the end of the nineteenth century and the era of progressive reform in
the United States and Europe. This culminates, after the extension of the
suffrage to women, in the creation of the modern welfare state, with its
protection of unions, workers, the elderly, and many others, and its concomitant
high rates of economic growth and increased economic equality in the 
10. See The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, AM. NAT’L 
ELECTION STUD. https://electionstudies.org/resources/anes-guide [https://perma.cc/N4MD- 
3CKS].
11. See id.
 12. See SOMIN, supra note 4, at 13. 
13. See id. at 17–22. 
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second half of the twentieth century.14  Granted there may be disagreement 
on whether this was good or bad; there is certainly a sufficiently large 
body of economic opinion that favors the development of the welfare state 
to suggest that reasonable people disagree here.  But one thing it seems 
hard to argue against is that the disadvantaged did know how to promote 
a plausible conception of their interests.  Another interesting piece of data
in support of this view is the recent work of economic historian Gavin Wright 
arguing that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 played a major role in boosting 
the economic fortunes of African-Americans in the South as well as those 
of poor whites, many of whom were also burdened by the literacy tests and 
poll taxes.15  Wright argues that we can see that Black disenfranchisement 
after the end of Reconstruction led to a precipitous loss in educational 
resources as well as other state resources previously devoted to African-
Americans and poor whites.16  And these resources were significantly restored
fairly soon after the passage of the Voting Rights Act.17 
When we add to these observations the more general findings that
democracies tend not to go to war with one another, tend to protect basic 
human rights much better than nondemocracies, tend to produce public 
goods on a much greater scale, avoid famine in areas previously plagued 
by it, and many other results,18 it is really hard to argue that the disadvantaged 
are not getting some significant bang for their votes. Just in case one is 
tempted to say that it is the nondemocratic aspects of democracy that are 
really doing the work in achieving these results, there is evidence explicitly
devoted to this question and it suggests that it is the majoritarian aspect of 
democracy that is most responsible for the protection of human rights.19 
This first problem already suggests that we should be looking to change 
the basic picture of the crude Downsian model.
The second problem is that people are not uniformly incapable of answering 
questions on surveys.20  Affluence and education tends to improve their
14. For a brief survey of evidence, see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 58–64 (2006). 
15. See GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 184–85, 198, 205–07 (2013). 
16. See id. at 33–34. 
17. See id. at 186–88, 198–202. 
18. For another survey of evidence, see Thomas Christiano, An Instrumental Argument 
for a Human Right to Democracy, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142, 143, 148–49 (2011). 
19. See CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, STATE REPRESSION AND THE DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC 
PEACE 176–79 (2007). 
20. See The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, supra note 10. 
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answers significantly.21  One might think this should be obvious.  But the
problem for the crude Downsian model is that the affluent and the educated 
should not be more informed about politics than anyone else.  Indeed, if 
they are well educated, one would think that they would follow the logic 
of collective action and rational ignorance with greater regularity than anyone 
else. They should be ignorant about politics because they know how little 
difference it makes to know something.  They should use their educations 
to develop knowledge that is more useful and more likely to make a difference.  
Yet, we do not see this.22  And indeed, we not only see that they are better
informed about politics but that politicians tend to be more responsive to 
them than to others.23  None of this makes any sense on the crude Downsian
model.  There should not be such a regular correlation between affluence, 
education, and informedness.  I will return to this in a moment. 
The third problem is that there is extensive evidence that people are
concerned with the common good in politics.  Furthermore, people tend
to act not exclusively as individual maximizers of their own or the common 
good. There is extensive evidence that people are willing to do their fair 
share in the pursuit of collective aims.24  They evaluate the group’s activity 
in terms of its outcomes, but they evaluate their own individual actions in 
terms of whether they are doing their fair shares of the group’s action. 
This entirely changes the calculations about what they ought to do. They
do not ask what the chances they will make a difference are individually, but 
what the chances the group of which they are members will make a difference
and how they can help.25 
The fourth big problem is with the individualism of justification. The 
demand that people must know the first order reasons for their actions and
beliefs is simply not met in the modern world for much of the action that 
we engage in, which action nevertheless does effectively promote our
ends.  We depend essentially in our lives on other people’s appreciation of 
the reasons for action.  We depend on doctors’, mechanics’, friends’, and
others’ judgments about good action, and the empirical conditions of action,
to be effective. We often do not know very much at all about the things 
we rely on in much of our lives.  And this is a good thing too.  If we could 
not rely effectively on a division of labor in the development of knowledge
necessary to promote our interests, we would be in bad shape.  We could 
21. See id.
 22. See Voter Turnout Demographics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.elect 
project.org/home/voter-turnout/demographics [https://perma.cc/3TAV-2AUY]. 
23. See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 234–52 (2012).
24. See Timothy J. Feddersen, Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting,
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 109 (2004). 
25. See id.
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not do our own jobs, take care of our families and other things.  The kind 
of knowledge necessary to the effective promotion of our ends is for the
most part held by other people.  We depend on them.  And the productivity
of the society depends on our depending on them.  When people are asked
about some of the basic features of their lives, such as the composition of 
the things that they eat or the functioning of all the machines they rely on, 
or the complications of tax law on which they rely, they generally answer
these questions very badly.26  The surveys are not better than in the case
of politics.27 Yet, they are able to do things reasonably well to further their
interests.28  This point, I think, defeats the connection between the claim 
that there is widespread inability to articulate an appreciation of the reasons 
and facts that justify action and the idea that people cannot effectively 
promote their interests and other ends.  It is quite possible that people are 
wrong one- to two-thirds of the time about the qualities of the products they 
buy and still are able to promote their ends with those products.  The key 
lies in the fact that they depend on reliable cues from others.  So, the evidence 
culled from surveys of political knowledge does not show that individual 
citizens are not acting on good political knowledge in politics.29 
It also defeats the inference, made by many, that we should turn such 
decisions over to the market.  We consumers, workers, managers, and owners
suffer from massive information deficits and use very low information
rationality in markets as well as in democracy.  The question is not whether 
shortcuts are used, but whether the society is organized in such a way that 
the shortcuts will tend to be good ones.30 I will say more about this later. 
26. See Gerry Mackie, Rational Ignorance and Beyond, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM:
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANICS 290, 290, 298–99 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012). 
27. See id.
 28. See id.
29. There is very substantial dissent from scholars of the political informedness of 
citizens about whether the surveys are giving a good picture of how informed citizens are.  
A large part of that dissent comes from appreciation of the fact that people use many 
different kinds of complicated methods including shortcuts to keep track of political events.  
For the classic statement of the importance of shortcuts, see generally DOWNS, supra note 
1, at 220–59.  For the seminal application of the idea of shortcuts to political information, 
see generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 
IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991).  For a recent sophisticated questioning of the significance 
of survey data, see generally ARTHUR LUPIA, UNINFORMED: WHY PEOPLE KNOW SO LITTLE 
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2016).
30. This is a serious mistake in Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels’ dismissive 
treatment of information shortcuts in their otherwise wonderful, though mistaken, book.  
See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY 
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In brief, the crude Downsian model is simply not up to the task of
characterizing the basic motivations and epistemological condition of most
ordinary citizens.  We need to start anew.  I will put together the elements
of a more sophisticated Downsian model of citizens in what follows. 
Much is still left to work out, but it is a start. 
IV. A NOTE ON METHOD
We need to pause here and think about what it is that we are doing in
this effort. Political philosophy is almost always a combination of social
science and philosophy.  How do these disciplines mesh?  They are clearly
coming together in this project, but we need to know more about how they
fit. The main way in which they are meant to fit here is that philosophy
is meant as a guide in constructing hypotheses that are to be more rigorously 
empirically tested.  Philosophy cannot itself answer the question about 
what citizens are likely to do or are willing to do in large numbers. What 
it can do is say something about what citizen participation would have to
look like if it is to fit into a political arrangement that is just and rational.
The normative standards that have to be defended philosophically are quite 
abstract and can be realized in a number of ways.  The task of the philosophical 
account is to elaborate different possible realizations and show how particular
arrangements can be said to realize the standard.  The idea then is to go from 
the normatively defensible principle to an account of how it is to be realized
in actual institutions. 
Once we have determined what kinds of institutional arrangements 
might realize the principles, we can construct hypotheses concerning the
behavior of citizens where the hypothesized behavior corresponds to the 
ethically salient features.  And these hypotheses can then be tested in various 
ways to determine if the institutions are plausible forms of social cooperation. 
To be sure, the process of reasoning does not normally work in this top-
down way. We might have a conception of what kinds of institutions are 
plausible kinds of social cooperation and then ask whether they accord
with reasonable principles or what kinds of adjustments would be necessary
to make them conform to principles. 
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 40–41 (2016).  The issue is not 
whether shortcuts are good in general; sometimes they are, sometimes they are not.  The 
issue is what conditions produce good shortcuts on the whole in the circumstances of 
particular groups of citizens. 
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V. POLITICAL EQUALITY AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR
We are looking for a way to realize equality among citizens in a society 
characterized by a highly differentiated division of labor, including an
intellectual division of labor in the area of politics.  Let me explain.  I proceed
primarily on the basis of the views of democracy and authority that I have
defended elsewhere.31  The underlying principle of democracy, I have
contended, is that democracy publicly realizes the equality of citizens
under the circumstances of disagreement, diversity, and cognitive bias and
under the assumption that there are deep interests in shaping the social world 
as a whole under these circumstances.  There are two central ideas here: popular 
control, by which I mean a wide distribution of political power, and equality,
which demands a kind of egalitarian distribution of power.  These requirements
are distinct depending on whether one thinks that the notion of equality is 
compatible with leveling down.  I have argued that it is not, and so equal 
distribution of political power implies that people actually do have power 
to advance their aims.32 
There is a further constraint that is important in democratic theory.  It
may be thought to be derivable from the egalitarian theory, but it is worth
drawing it out since it is interesting on its own and it will pose a puzzle 
for the view that I will defend.  I have said that we are interested in the distribution
of power. But power is not an easy notion to pin down, especially when 
we come to the question of the ability of persons to inform themselves 
about matters that are important to them.  The reason why there is a puzzle 
is that one can, in the process of informing oneself, come to a change of 
preference.  Indeed, this is something that we expect and even hope for many
times in democracy.  We hope that democratic discussion and debate will
improve people’s preferences.
At the same time, however, we take the stance that democracy is impartial
between at least a very wide array of preferences.  This implies that democratic
principles do not presume the validity of one set of values or preferences 
as opposed to many others—within limits, to be sure. To put it in a weaker 
way, democratic principles are meant to be quite open about these values. 
This makes it difficult to assess when a person is better informed than 
31. See generally THOMAS CHRISTIANO,THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY:DEMOCRATIC
AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS (2008); THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL 
ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1996) [hereinafter CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY]. 
32. See Thomas Christiano & Will Braynen, Inequality, Injustice and Levelling 
Down, 21 RATIO 392, 393–94 (2008). 
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another or even than he was in the past.  If power is defined in terms of 
ability to get what one wants, we need to have a metric for evaluating how 
able a person is to inform himself without presuming a conception of his 
interests or values.  To some extent we are able to do this, of course.  We
design systems of education with some concern that they be worthwhile
for a very wide variety of aims.  But there are limits.  If, in our conception 
of power, we are to take into account the ability of people to inform themselves 
or even reflectively to revise their preferences, we may find that we cannot 
define people’s power without reference to a set of interests we impute to 
them.33  I note this here, but I will come back to it. 
The trouble that the crude Downsian picture poses for the idea that 
democracy involves a wide and equal distribution of power is that it is 
unclear how we can think that citizens have any power at all since they
would be expected not to know anything about the issues that are in play
in politics or the political system that they are supposed to be controlling. 
They are in the position of children in the driver’s seat of a car who do not 
know the first thing about how to drive it or where to go with it.  It is hard
to see how the system goes anywhere on this view. 
We noted two facts that seem to contravene the crude picture.  We noted
that democratic societies seem to be advancing the interests of the broad 
mass of people in a society.34  We also noted that people are quite unevenly
informed about politics in ways that track affluence and education.35 Downs
argues that because there is a systematic cause of this difference in information, 
some people have more power than others.36  And indeed, his view is that
the affluent will tend to have significantly more power than others.  The 
basic logic behind this idea is that politicians pay attention to the views and
ideas of the affluent because they know the affluent are paying attention 
to them.37  At the same time, politicians can avoid worrying too much about
the views of the others because they are only seldomly paying attention.38 
This appears to have some empirical support in the work of Larry Bartels 
and Martin Gilens who argue that politicians are much more responsive
to the preferences of the views of the affluent than to others.39  We already
noted this as a problem for the crude Downsian view because it suggests 
33. This is a version of the issue unearthed by Steven Lukes, see STEVEN LUKES, 
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 34 (1974). 
34. See generally ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 14. 
35. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 235. 
36. See id. at 257. 
37. See id.; GILENS, supra note 23, at 234–52. 
38. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 236. 
39. See generally LARRY M.BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY:THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2d ed. 2016); GILENS, supra note 23.  We will see some important 
exceptions to these observations later. 
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that some people are well informed about politics despite the fact that the 
very same logic of rational ignorance applies to them as well. 
In addition, however, the more sophisticated Downsian view poses a 
problem for the egalitarian conception of democracy because it seems to
offer a kind of systematic prediction of inequality within democracy.  Downs 
argues that inequality of political power is a necessary part of democracy
since it is a necessary concomitant to the division of labor in modern 
society.40  Here, again, power is understood in terms of the ability to get
representatives to do what one wants them to do. 
So, we have three main values here: (1) the wide dispersion of political
power, (2) an egalitarian distribution of power, and (3) a wide distribution 
of abilities to acquire understanding and information, which distribution 
is understood in a way that is open to a wide array of preferences. These 
values are then to be made compatible, if possible, with the central reality
of the division of labor to modern political societies.  The existence of this 
division of labor, which includes an intellectual division of labor, is what 
poses the main problem for the equal distribution of power in a democracy.
In a phrase, the problem is to reconcile the ideal of the equal distribution 
of power with the central reality of the division of labor.  This is precisely
what Downs thought was impossible and remains a challenge even if we 
reject the crude Downsian picture. 
I hope to make a little progress in this project of reconciliation, but the 
progress cannot be completed by philosophy alone.  What philosophy can 
do is say what the contours of citizenship must be like in order that
this reconciliation be possible. But social science remains necessary to 
determine whether, to what extent or under what conditions, that ideal of 
citizenship can be realized. 
VI. THE ROLE OF CITIZENSHIP
In previous work, I defend the thesis that the ideal of citizenship can be
satisfied if citizens are the choosers of the aims of society and the rest of 
the apparatus of the state is devoted to realizing those values.  By this, I 
mean that they choose the values and the relevant trade-offs between those 
values. By values I had in mind both outcome values and procedural values 
such as rights.  And the values and trade-offs are to be chosen in an egalitarian 
process of collective decision-making.  The degree of determinacy of these
40. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 257. 
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choices would have to be sufficient to guide the making of policy.41  There 
are limits of course, I argue, in that they are not permitted to choose values 
and trade-offs that are inconsistent with the values that undergird democracy, 
which I claim also undergird basic liberal rights. 
A brief note on social choice theory is worth a moment here. I was
untroubled by the results of social choice theory and remain so because I
do not see the point of democracy as being the choice of a collective
preference or will in any traditional substantive sense.  Each person is
aiming at justice and the common good, I claim, but they disagree on what 
these are.  The point of the democratic process is the equal distribution of 
power so as to allow each their opportunities to determine the outcome.
Hence, cycles and other difficulties of social choice theory are problems,
but they are problems that citizens have to deal with in an egalitarian way.42 
The choice of aims model gets at an important feature of democracy
and has the potential to reconcile democracy with the division of labor 
because we do not generally recognize expertise on the subject of what 
aims society must pursue.  To be sure, some people are better at thinking
about this than others, but who those people are is not something that one 
can give an uncontroversial account of from a public standpoint.  The society 
is too pluralistic to be able to do that. 
The trouble with the choice of aims model is that it seems incomplete. 
And here I only give an intuitive argument.  It is not enough that people 
determine the aims the society pursues; they must have some awareness
that that they are doing so.  If we determine the aims of society but have no 
sense that the society is pursuing those aims, then there is something highly 
incomplete about our control.  Some kind of reasonable confidence that
the society is doing this also needs to be part of democratic citizenship.  That
reasonable confidence can then play a role in rethinking the aims when we
see that the society has done what it can to achieve them, and we see what
that society is like. 
But this is where the Downsian problem picks up again.  The reasonable 
confidence is something that depends on empirical knowledge and this 
can be quite uneven in the population.  It will, Downs argues, be unevenly
distributed in a way caused by the division of labor. 
41. See CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY, supra note 31, at 165–201. 
42. See generally Thomas Christiano, Political Equality, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES:
NOMOS XXXII 151 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990); Thomas Christiano, 
Social Choice and Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 173 (David Copp, Jean Hampton 
& John E. Roemer eds., 2009).  For a more developed conception of this approach, see 
generally SEAN INGHAM, RULE BY MULTIPLE MAJORITIES: A NEW THEORY OF POPULAR 
CONTROL (2019). 
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In the next three sections, I want to give a revised micro theory of
citizenship that can help us think about how to solve some of the difficulties 
Downs thought were impossible to solve.  We are being guided here by an 
egalitarian conception of democracy and a related conception of the role 
of citizenship, which I have just described.  And we are trying to see how
this role of citizenship can be satisfied in a reasonably egalitarian way in 
a society with a complex division of labor.  I will then develop a very simple 
model of the economics of information in political contexts and show how
the problem of inequality arises.  Then I will show how certain kinds 
of institutional ideas can help ameliorate the problem of inequality.  This 
introduces complementarity of the sort I described at the beginning.  I will 
then raise a puzzle about my solution because it appears to take a stand on
appropriate values that we normally want to avoid.  What I will then try to do 
is show how another kind of complementarity might help ease the worry
somewhat.
A. Towards a More Sophisticated Micro-Theory of 
Democratic Citizenship 
There are three components of the view I will develop here.  First, I assert 
a certain conception of motivation that makes reasonably informed citizens 
possible.  Second, I develop a small model of economics of information that
can explain the inequality we see but that also suggests how inequality can be 
mitigated. Third, I suggest an institutional fix.
Let us consider a different account of rational motivation in this context.
People might become informed because they think it is their duty to do 
their fair share in the collective project of political decision-making.  They
might think of themselves as members of groups of various sorts such as 
citizens, progressives, free marketeers, conservatives, defenders of public
morals, members of a particular political party or whatever.  They are 
members in part because they think that the aims of the group are, on the 
whole, good ones to try to achieve by means of policy, and they think the 
group is competently pursuing those goals.  This involves two elements. 
They have a concern for the common good and justice, which they pursue 
within a larger group of people.  And they want to make contributions to the 
pursuit of the aims of their groups and think that they should do their fair 
shares within that group to help it promote the desirable aims.  People do
this, to think of a nonpolitical instance, when they contribute to recycling.
They might think that the group or groups of which they are members have 
chances to affect outcomes and then proceed to do their fair share of helping
 949








      
 
   













      
 





     
       
 
the group bring about desirable outcomes.  The group is acting in an outcome
oriented way, but each individual is only partly acting in an outcome oriented
way; they are also just doing their shares to advance the group’s concerns.
There is evidence that citizens are genuinely committed to pursuing the 
common good in the context of politics.  First, their participation seems to
suggest this.43 And second, surveys uniformly suggest that they are concerned 
with the common good in voting.44  There is also substantial evidence that 
people are motivated by the idea of contributing a fair share to a collective 
project, at least when they perceive enough others to be similarly motivated.45 
They are motivated to be “strong reciprocators” in many different kinds 
of environments.46  And these motivations have been detected in numerous
controlled experiments.47 But the activity of citizenship is an obvious context
in which this kind of practical reasoning can take place.  And there is evidence 
that people think of themselves as motivated by this kind of reasoning in
politics.48  Of course, how active citizens are will depend on how much 
others are participating, and how informed they are will depend on the 
norms they accept concerning how informed they should be.  We do not have
a clear model of how this kind of motivation works in the context of citizenship,
but it would be reasonable to think that it is of great importance. 
When we combine these two points, we can see that the potential for 
citizens to think that they should be reasonably well informed, and that it 
might be rational for them to be so, is quite high.  Much depends on how 
concerned they are with the common good and whether they are willing 
to do their fair share in promoting that common good, as well as how much
they think others are doing their parts. These are very large questions about
what citizens are motivated to do and without answers to them, an essential 
part of the crude Downsian inference to the conclusion that citizens will
simply be ignorant of politics is undefended and seems to be false in significant 
part.
The other essential element of the sophisticated Downsian approach 
starts with a kind of collectivism in practical and theoretical justification. 
What I mean here is that many times we act on the basis of first order reasons
43. See Satoshi Kanazawa, Why Do People Vote?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 8, 2009), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-scientific-fundamentalist/200911/why-do-
people-vote-i [https://perma.cc/8959-K3L8].
44. See Mackie, supra note 26, at 290. 
45. See id.
46. Ernest Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC 
LIFE 151, 151 (Herbet Gintis et al. eds., 2005). 
47. For a classic statement of this approach and the many sources of evidence,
see generally id. at 151–92. 
48. See id. at 290. 
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that only others appreciate.  I think my car is in good shape and drive it 
without concern because my mechanic thinks it is fine. I think I am in good
health because my doctor says so.  I do not really know the reasons for this, 
but to the extent that the mechanic and doctors I rely on are trustworthy, I 
act on the basis of good information.  I cannot articulate the reasons, and 
I do not have an appreciation of them.  As I noted above, this kind of dependence 
on other people’s knowledge is ubiquitous in modern life, which depends 
heavily on the division of labor both cognitive and noncognitive.49  But it 
does not undercut the ability of people effectively to promote their interests, 
indeed the opposite is true. To put it in a slogan, for hunter gatherers, each 
of whom know an enormous amount about their environments, life is short 
and difficult, while for us, who do not, life is long and easy.  But let me fill 
this picture out with an economics of information, which displays the 
collective dimension of knowledge. 
B. Economics of Information
Let us put together a very simple model of the economics of information 
here.  Every person collects information up to the point where the marginal
benefit of the information equals the marginal cost. And if we take the
springs of motivation to be those I outlined above, marginal benefit refers 
to the extent of my doing my share in promoting the collective aim and
marginal cost refers to the other aims I do not contribute to and the things
I cannot do to advance my interests and those of my friends and family. 
This is quite a heterogeneous set of things so it will be hard to give it a clear
formal representation.  In any case, this is the basic principle of information 
gathering.  What this implies is that people will economize on information
gathering. They will not try to know everything because the marginal cost
of acquiring a lot of such knowledge is greater than the marginal benefit.
The more time I spend collecting information, say, about politics or about
my car, the less time I have to do other things like play with my child or do 
my job.  At some point, the marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit 
of new information.  And in such a case, I do not collect the relevant information.
This is what Downs means by rational ignorance.  There are many things 
of which I am ignorant because it is not worth my while to collect the 
information. 
49. For a discussion of this in many different areas of life, see generally RUSSELL 
HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW? THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE (2009). 
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There are two essential steps here. First, I need to know something in 
order to figure out what the marginal costs and benefits are.  Second, I need
to know how to diminish the costs of information collection. 
The first step is achieved by what Downs calls the “free information 
system.”  This is information that we get for free in the sense that we do not 
acquire it by expending any effort or time or money for the purposes 
of politics itself.50  We get the information for other purposes.  Lawyers
get information about the law in order to do their job; businesspeople get 
information about taxes and regulation in order properly to organize their 
business. We get information from doing our jobs, from talking to colleagues, 
friends, and family.  We get information in school, which we are required 
to absorb.  And we get information just because it is thrust upon us in everyday 
life. Again, this information is free in the sense that the person who has 
it did not expend any effort or money on collecting it for the purposes of 
politics. It is useful for politics but, as such, it is a by-product of other activities.  
It is from this information that we can begin to form the judgments about 
what further information is worth trying to get and how to get it.  Without 
the first step, there is no way we would even be interested in knowing 
about politics.51  I will say more about this, but for Downs, differences in 
the reception of free information play a large role in explaining differences 
in the extent of political knowledge and thus in explaining inequality of 
power.
One thing that is not well explained on the crude Downsian model of
isolated individuals is the fact that some groups in political society tend to be
pretty well informed. These are in general the well educated and the relatively 
affluent.52  Good education does not entail good political information, of
course. Indeed, on the crude model these people have no more reason to 
become informed than anyone else. One might even think that they have
reason to be less informed since they presumably understand the logic of
rational ignorance better than others do. Yet the reverse is the case.53 
At the same time, there is good evidence that representatives and senators
in the United States tend to be much more responsive to the concerns of 
relatively affluent individuals in their political decision-making than to 
the concerns of others.54  Hence, the better information seems to pay off. 
Downs thought that this made sense because the relatively affluent, on average, 
are more likely to have jobs that interact with law and government in 
sophisticated ways, and so these people are more likely to start from a base 
50. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 221. 
51. See id. at 224. 
52. See id. at 235. 
53. See Voter Turnout Demographics, supra note 22. 
54. See BARTELS, supra note 39, at 1–3; GILENS, supra note 23, at 234–52. 
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of free information acquired from work.55 The information is free because 
it is acquired for the purpose of doing good work but then becomes useful 
to them in their roles as citizens.  Furthermore, affluent people interact with 
other affluent people who have similar sources of free information in different 
jobs. Thus, they learn more from their work and they learn from their coworkers 
and family members about other politically important facts.  Hence, they 
start from a good base, which enables them to engage in much more effective 
pursuit of information from there.  They have a better sense of what the 
marginal costs and marginal benefits are from further information and methods 
of saving information.  This is, then, a powerful source of inequality.  Not 
the only one, but an essential one. 
The second step involves further collection of information.  And here 
we rely heavily on various methods for reducing the costs of collecting 
information, in all walks of life.  As Downs observes, we rely heavily 
on friends, coworkers, newspapers, opinion leaders, television, political 
parties, interest groups, and other networks to receive information.56  But
we also rely on these crucially to avoid having to receive information.  Many
of us, completely rationally, rely just on party affiliation to determine who 
to vote for, and we effectively advance our ends by doing so. We also rely 
on each other and opinion leaders without knowing the reasons for which 
the opinion leaders act.  As long as party, friends, and opinion leaders make 
recommendations on the basis of reasons that are important to us, we do 
not need to know more.  Here, too, there is an important source of inequality 
since the affluent have more resources that help them in the pursuit of better 
information.  All of this implied for Downs that people who are better off 
would be better informed and more effective than the others. 
One main point to remember is that it simply does not follow that people 
who do not answer questions very well about politics do not make good
choices in politics.  In fact, we know people make a lot of good choices in
many areas of life without possessing the knowledge to show that they are 
good choices.57  And so, this reasoning is not strong enough to defeat the
evidence given above that the disadvantaged have benefited greatly from 
participation in the political system.  The evidence is not conclusive, to be 
55. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 220–37. 
56. See id.
57. This is one of the main messages of recent thinkers such as Arthur Lupia. See
Lupia, supra note 29, at 3; James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Conceptual Foundations 
of Citizen Competence, 23 POL. BEHAV. 285, 288 (2001). 
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sure, but I do not think the election surveys give us good reason to doubt 
the direction of causality from voters to beneficial policy.
Notice here that the fact that only one third of a population can answer 
basic questions about politics may be a sign of great efficiency.  Why not
have different people hold different pieces of information?  Again, we do
this kind of sharing in markets all the time, why not do it in the case of
democracy? 
The key question here, of course, is whether the networks of people and 
institutions are set up to be reliable sources of free information and reliable 
sources of shortcuts.  And the further question is whether the networks
operate in such a way that there is a kind of egalitarian distribution.  This 
is where complementarity comes into play. 
C. Institutions Matter 
These reflections point to the importance of institutions to democracy. 
The above arguments are not meant to suggest that all is fine in modern 
democracies.  They are only meant to suggest that there are rational and 
effective ways for people to make good decisions even with low levels of 
information.  They suggest how democracies have been able to achieve 
what they have achieved, but they can also point to how democracies can
be improved.  The previous analysis implies that how well people make
decisions—both in democracy and in markets—will depend very much
on how reliable the groups of people and networks they rely on really are. 
Whether things go well depends essentially on whether networks of information 
are set up in such a way that enables people to make good decisions.  And
this is where institutional design can play a large role. 
With regard to free information, for example, Downs argues that the
dishwasher will not have much in the way of quality free information from 
work and so will be at a disadvantage with regard to information collection 
relative to professionals, business managers, and government employees.58 
And to the extent that the dishwasher’s coworkers, friends, and family are 
in similar circumstances, the information they receive from discussion 
will not be as good as that which is shared by professionals and business 
persons.59  This is straightforwardly a consequence of the division of labor.
Hence, as a result of the structure of the division of labor alone, there will 
be significant inequality in politics.  This does not mean, of course, that 
people in these positions cannot be adequately informed to make some difference 
in advancing their interests.  And I think we have ample evidence that they 
58. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 220–37. 
59. Id.
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are able to make a difference.  But the issue posed here concerns ways in 
which the distribution of power is affected by the division of labor.
But there is reason for questioning the stark contrast Downs draws between 
managers and professionals on the one hand and workers on the other hand. 
There may be ways in which the division of labor can be altered so as to bring
ordinary workers into a higher quality free information stream. There has 
been a spate of recent studies that suggest that there are institutions from
which working class and lower middle-class people can benefit both economically
and politically.60  These studies suggest that unions have played a significant
role in making representatives and senators responsive to working class 
and middle-class people, bucking the tendency pointed to by Bartels and 
Gilens.61  These studies suggest that districts with strong union presence 
show significantly less inequality of representation than districts with 
weaker union representation.62  The effect seems to be through the activity 
of voting and not primarily through union funding of campaigns.63  Furthermore,
it appears that part of the reason for this increase in responsiveness is that 
union members are better informed than nonunion members about matters 
of importance to them both.  They tend to take more nuanced views of political 
issues.64 The results have suggested that the responsiveness of governments, 
representatives, and senators to working class concerns has declined appreciably
with the decline of unions.65 
This is relatively new work, but it has been growing rapidly in the last 
five years.  It requires further analysis.  But it does fit with the sophisticated
Downsian model, in which unionized workers receive a great deal of free
but high quality information at their workplace.  The union must make good 
use of law and government to advance worker interests in the workplace,
and workers need to take account of this in the workplace; this information,
then, is available for free in political contexts.  Furthermore, the shop floor 
provides a good context in which information is shared among differently 
informed persons.  This may be an example of institutional structure that
60. See Patrick Flavin, Labor Union Strength and Equality of Political Representation, 
48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1075, 1076–77 (2016). 
61. See id.; supra note 39 and accompanying text.
62. See Flavin, supra note 60, at 1077–78. 
63. See id. at 1075; Daniel Stegmueller, Michael Becher & Konstantin Käppner,
Labor Unions and Equal Representation, Paper Delivered at 113th APSA Annual Meeting 
(Sept. 1, 2017). 
64. See Sung Eun Kim & Yotam Margalit, Informed Preferences? The Impact of
Unions on Workers’ Policy Views, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 728, 730 (2017). 
65. See id. at 728–29. 
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can enhance workers’ understanding of politically important information
in a rational way.  It does this by improving the information networks ordinary
workers participate in.
More generally, various forms of worker participation in the governance of
firms, including though not limited to union participation, may help overcome 
the kinds of problems Downs points to.  By worker participation, I mean
some kind of worker participation in the management of the firm. This 
means the addition of workers’ voice to the decision-making of firms.  This 
may involve participation in unions, it may involve some kind of codetermination
as is required in German firms of more than 2000 workers,66 it may involve 
worker ownership with some kind of control rights.  I mean for the category 
to be quite broad.  I think there is evidence that each one of these forms of 
worker participation can be value enhancing for firms.67  But different forms
of worker participation may be desirable for different kinds of markets.68 
Recall that the Downsian problem is that there is an inalterable conflict 
between equality and a complex division of labor.  And that a significant 
part of this conflict is derived from the flow of free information to the 
different positions in the division of labor.  Some positions in the division
of labor benefit from very high quality free information that enables people 
to go on to make good decisions concerning what information to look for
and where to look for it.  And one key difference is that some persons are 
in positions of control in firms, which exposes them to the fine grain of 
law and policy, while others are not.  One can see here that a promising solution 
to the Downsian problem, if there is one, is to alter the division of labor.69 
VII. COMPLEMENTARITY
You can see that the thesis I am putting forward here is a form of 
complementarity of the second sort I announced at the beginning. Employees’
voice in the economic realm can help enhance the voice of these very same
66. See Felix R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 
95 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 365, 367 (1993) (discussing the 1976 Codetermination Act). 
67. For the most wide-ranging and careful economic study of worker managed firms, 
see generally GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (2003). 
68. For the locus classicus on the value enhancing qualities of unions, see RICHARD 
B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 246–47 (1984); see also, TITO 
BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS 14 (2d ed. 2013); 
RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS: THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S. LABOR MARKET 5–6 (2007). 
69. For a defense of the educative role of worker participation as a way of enhancing 
participation in political democracy, compare CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 110 (1970).  My thesis here complements hers.  While she focuses 
on the effect of worker participation on the sense of efficacy of workers, I am focusing on 
the ability of participation to enhance the informational abilities of workers. 
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people in the larger political system because it can play a role in enhancing 
the informational abilities of those employees.  I think we have reason to
agree with Downs that the division of labor may be detracting from the
quality of participation from a large swath of the population, and that it 
diminishes the voice of this group dramatically.  But I think there is reason
to believe that the division of labor itself can be changed.  It is itself a
product of politics.  We see ample evidence of economies that operate with 
divisions of labor that give employees voice in the management of firms,
either through unions or through direct representation on boards of firms,
or both.
There are a number of ways that an employee’s right to a say in firms
can enhance their political abilities as citizens.  First, it enhances the flow 
of free information to employees because they must become acquainted 
with law and policy relating to firms in order to perform their role in the 
firm.  If they are in a firm where their coworkers also have a say, then they
will also benefit from the information sharing that takes place as a result 
of casual conversation among workers in the firm.  And if their family
members also have rights to a say in their firms, they can also share information 
among themselves.  They can then all benefit from their different positions 
in the division of labor.
This great increase in the flow of free information will greatly enhance 
each person’s ability to become informed about the society and political
system they live in.  It can give a much more solid basis on which to decide
what kinds of information to pursue and what kinds of shortcuts to make 
use of.  They will become better at sorting out the wheat from the chaff in 
the political information they are exposed to on the internet and in social 
media. They become less prone to demagoguery in the political sphere, 
or so the hypothesis I am exploring suggests.  To be sure, there are no guarantees
here, there will still be room for uninformed and unintelligent activity, but
the tendency will be diminished. 
Second, the institutions of which workers are members will themselves 
be a good source of rationally founded information and information shortcuts. 
This is particularly true of unions that have large memberships and internal
divisions of labor with expertise on matters of law and policy.  Membership
in unions can provide members with access to information that is rationally 
geared to the interests of workers.  It can also provide information shortcuts 
for employees insofar as the unions are properly organized. 
Third, membership in unions and firms with worker participation can
provide the members with the experience of argumentation and debate
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that is so important in the political sphere.  The debate, insofar as it is 
disciplined by the needs of the firm and the workers, is likely to give the 
members an experience in debate that is disciplined and constrained and, 
thus, be a school for participation in debate in the larger society.70 
VIII. WORRIES
One worry to which my proposal can give rise, and which requires further 
reflection, is that it may seem to violate the impartiality that democracy
ought to take towards people’s preferences and values, within substantial 
limits.  This is because my proposal is recommending an alteration of the
division of labor on the grounds that this will enable workers or lower middle 
class and poorer citizens to gain greater informational abilities in the political 
process and, thus, greater political power.  But this thesis is committed to 
the idea that greater informational abilities with regard to economic organization
is an especially prominent concern that should be accorded a special place 
in political organization—special enough to warrant a major intervention 
in the division of labor.  Does this not introduce a kind of bias in favor of
economic issues into our thinking about the political system?  And does
this proposal not take too much of a stance on a set of issues on which
democratic societies ought to have a say? 
I think this worry should be taken seriously.  But I want to say several 
things to mitigate the worry.  First, the proposal leaves a lot of room for 
different views of employees, so it does not take a particular stand on these. 
And the particular proposal leaves substantial room for different ways in 
which worker voice can be realized in the market.  Second, the proposal 
merely emphasizes something that is quite important to the vast majority
of people in a society—namely the legal organization of economic life.  It 
is not as if this proposal imposes these concerns on most people; it simply
enhances their abilities to deal with the issues.  Third, the proposal does not 
preclude other issues from having great importance in politics.  Questions 
of morality, religion, education are not likely to be crowded out by a more 
sophisticated approach to economic organization.  Fourth, greater sophistication
in economic matters and on the issues that relate to these matters should 
be to the advantage of political thinking about other matters. 
Another worry is that I have not given a conclusive demonstration that
the approach recommended here will work to enhance ordinary citizens’
70. For the classic source for this argument, see id. at 109; Joshua Cohen & Joel 
Rogers, Associations and Democracy, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 1993, at 282, 283; 
Martin O’Neill & Stuart White, Trade Unions and Political Equality, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 252, 252 (Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia Mantouvalou 
eds., 2018). 
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participation in democracy.  I readily agree with that.  I have stated all
along that the philosophically guided reflections on economic and political 
institutions must be completed by social science.  I have offered some social 
science to suggest that the task may be worth pursuing, but conclusive proof 
is not available at this point.
Another worry is that unions have been in decline and worker participation
of other forms has not managed to take off in the market.71 This may 
suggest that these institutional recommendations may make the relevant 
markets much less efficient and productive.  This too is a worry I take seriously. 
But I do not think we have conclusive evidence for the thesis that enhancing 
workers’ voice in any of these ways will stifle productivity or efficiency. 
First, the decline of unions is much more a political decision than anything 
else. And it has not particularly enhanced the efficiency of markets in the
United States.72  If anything, it appears to have helped in the dramatic increase 
in inequality over the last forty years.73  Furthermore, the presence of powerful 
unions is quite compatible with high functioning economies, as we see in 
northern Europe and in the United States before 1975.74 Moreover, the
presence of more direct forms of worker participation has been reasonably
successful in Germany, though there is a lot of debate about it, still.75 
Finally, the absence of worker participation in economies that do not require 
it owes much to market imperfections and inequality in the society.76 
IX. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the issues raised by skeptics about democracy are important 
ones to discuss.  They go to an oddly neglected part of democratic theory, 
which is the way in which citizens can become or not become able to make
good decisions in a political society.  I have tried to show that pessimism 
71. JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 3 (2014) 
72. See id. at 52–54. 
73. For the argument that inequality is in significant part owing to the decline of
unions, see id. at 78. 
74. See Caleb Crain, State of the Unions: What Happened to America’s Labor Movement?, 
NEW YORKER (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/26/state-
of-the-unions [https://perma.cc/82W6-TYYA].
75. See FitzRoy & Kraft, supra note 66, at 366. 
76. For the proof that in perfectly competitive and complete markets, labor renting
capital and capital renting labor are equally viable forms of the organization of production, 
see JACQUES DRÈZE, LABOUR MANAGEMENT, CONTRACTS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: A GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 25–26 (1989). 
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about democracy is overstated and that there may be good grounds for 
thinking that democracy can work well despite the necessity that it work 
in a context of low information decision-making.  The problem of low
information decision-making need not undermine democracy’s promise to
advance the interests of citizens broadly.  A careful attention to the institutional
context in which citizens operate is necessary to make good on this promise.
Indeed, the idea explored here is to reshape the division of labor so as to 
enhance the participation of workers in political democracy. 
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